A NEW APPROACH OF THE BUDGET DEFICIT: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS by Ioan Talpos et al.
A NEW APPROACH OF THE BUDGET DEFICIT:  
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 







Economic policies and, particularly, fiscal policies are not designed and implemented in an 
“empty  space”:  the  structural  characteristics  of  the  economic  systems,  the  institutional 
architecture of societies, the cultural paradigm and the power relations between different social 
groups, define the borders of these policies. 
This paper tries to deal with these borders, to describe their nature and the implications of their 
existence  to  the  fiscal  policies’  quality  and  impact  at  a  theoretical  level  as  well  as  at  an 
empirical one. 
The  main  results  of  the  proposed  analysis  support  the  ideas  that  the  mentioned  variables 
matters both for the social mandate entrusted by the society to the state and thus to role and 
functions of the state and for the economic growth as a support of the resources collected at 
distributed by the public authorities. 
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Economic policies and, particularly, fiscal policies are not designed and implemented in 
an  “empty  space”:  the  structural  characteristics  of  the  economic  systems,  the  institutional 
architecture of societies, the cultural paradigm and the power relations between different social 
groups, define the borders of these policies. 
This paper tries to deal with these borders, to describe their nature and the implications of 
their existence to the fiscal policies’ quality and impact.  
The main hypothesis of the proposed analysis could be summarized as follows: 
: H 1  The public authorities are acting according to a social mandate entrusted by the 
society inside the “rules of the game”
2; 
: 2 H There are no differences between different social groups in the formulation of this 
mandate or, alternatively, the mandate is the result of a “perfect” social compromise; 
: 3 H The public authorities are acting only in the limits of the social mandate so there is 
no a hidden agenda of this authorities and/or modification of their behaviour over an electoral 
cycle. In other words, the public bureaucracy and the society have the same objectives.  
Within  this  general  framework,  the  structural  and  institutional  variables,  the  cultural 
paradigm and the power relations influence the level and the structure of the budget deficit as 
follow: 
￿  In a direct manner, via the formulation and application of the social mandate which is 
entrusted to the public authorities; 
￿  In an indirect manner, via the impact on the economic growth and thus on the level, 
frequencies and structure of public incomes and on the level and nature of public expenditures.   
As OTTAVIANO, PINELLI and MAIGNAN [2003; p. 30] noted: “Classical writers in 
economics, such as David Hume (1848), Adam Smith (1776), John Stuart Mill (1847), realised 
and discussed about the importance of institutions, such as firms, families, contracts, markets, 
rules and regulations, and social norms to economic development. Weber (1905) identified the 
protestant ethics as one of the roots of the surge of capitalism”. 
Important changes in the economic dynamic’s study occurred with ROMER’s [1986] and 
LUCAS’ [1988] contributions and especially with NORTH’s [1990] shift of attention to the 
institutions that shape the incentive structure, which drives the economic evolutions. 
Actually, there is a growing body of both theoretical and empirical works that try to enlighten 
the connections between development and quality of institutions (in particular, the role of the 
property rights and the rule of law), political regimes, social infrastructures, cultural values, and 
others “imponderables”. For instance, RODRIK [2000] discusses the types of institutions that 
allow the markets to perform adequately; ALI and CRAIN [2002] investigate the relationship 
between economic growth and economic freedom; INGLEHART [1997] describes the “cultural 
learning process” and its impact on economic developments; RAUCH [1994] emphasizes the 
role of “bureaucracy” and of the institutional environment in the private economic decision.  
Interesting contributions are provided by DE JONG and SEMENOV [2002; p.16]. Their 
point  of  view  (“There  are  trade-offs  between  the  various  criteria,  in  particular,  between 
solidarity, on the one hand, and efficiency, autonomy, promoting self-reliance and initiative, on 
the other. Thus, the society should decide on the relative importance of each of these values. 
This decision is crucially influenced by deeply rooted cultural values and has a crucial impact 
                                                 
2 This mean that the present theoretical framework is based on the mandat theory . But one should notice that there 
is nothing special supposed about the mandatory powers of the society so that a „standard” model of a democratic 
society could be, for the sake of the convenience, applied.   3 
on the character of social welfare systems”) is largely similar to our own position exposed here 
etc. 
The aim of this paper is to build a conceptual framework able to describe, in a holistic 
approach, the connections between the quality of market institutions, economic structures and 
mechanisms, socio-cultural models (“paradigms”) and political freedom on the one side, and 
the attributions assumed by the state on the other side. The proposed analysis is based on the 
thesis that the classical tools of economic policy are inefficient in a market characterized by 
“empty” institutions, wrong mechanisms of resources allocation, luck of autonomy for the civil 
society and counter- productive cultural values.  
Section 2 tries to set up the taxonomy of the “structural” characteristics of the economic 
systems and to analyze in this theoretical framework the impact of the shocks associated with 
the “ignition” of economic growth and, correlative, the state involvement in the economy like a 
“compensatory power”. 
Section 3 lists the institutions that can constitute a support for a sustainable economic 
dynamic and tries to explain why these institutions are important for the quality of the public 
actions and for their impact.   
Section  4  deals  with  the  socio-cultural  paradigm  and,  more  exactly,  with  the  mental 
infrastructures of the economic processes. These infrastructures are classified in terms of social 
openness  (i.e.  the  social  capacity  to  react  to  changes  induced  by  a  turbulent  economic 
environment).  
In Section 5 some empirical results are reported, which could be used like a small proof 
for the theoretical output. 
Finally, we present a set of critical aspects, which are able, in our vision, to endanger the 
consistency and coherence of the proposed analysis. 
 
 




The intrinsic structural features of the economic systems represent a critical determinant 
for the “amalgamation” of the resources and mechanisms (responsible for the economic growth) 
in the subsequent economic processes.   
We propose taxonomy of the economic systems using three - sectorial model in three 
meta - types (“A”, “B” and “C”) in order to create a real image of the way the structural 
features influence the de facto configuration of the growth process, and especially gives it a 
durable  character.  The  main  elements  of  the  economic  systems  took  into  account  in  this 
classification may be synthesized as follows: 
 
I. For the real sector:  
￿  the amount of real existing capital (physic and informational) and also its return; 
￿  the volume, structure and allocation mechanisms of the available resources (material and 
informational resources); 
￿  the characteristics of the labour (availability and effectiveness of labour offer, mobility, 
organizational structures, mechanism of nominal wage determination) 
￿  the relations between different component sectors and segments,  public and private sector,  
internal and external economic subjects; 
￿  real assets and markets classification; 
￿  investments opportunities ; 
￿  the structure of the economic subjects incomes ;   4 
￿  informational asymmetry ; 
￿  the relations between microeconomic decision centres (managerial bureaucracy
3 and the 
capital owners). 
 
II. For the public authority: 
￿  the relations between fiscal authority and monetary authority ; 
￿  the status of public bureaucracy  (due to its ability in blocking/influencing  public decision); 
￿  the fiscal system, its efficiency, the public resources main destinations (dependent on the 
role the fiscal authority assumes in the economic system) and also the dimension of the 
fiscal and quasi- fiscal deficit. 
 
III. For the monetary sector: 
￿  the classification of the financial intermediaries ; 
￿  the main elements which characterize the banking sector : 
￿  the number of components; 
￿  the level of competitive concentration;  
￿  the proportion of the resources which are held in the banking system from the total 
available  resources  in  economy,  or  in  other  words,  the  intensity  of  banking  sector 
participation in the  financial intermediation process; 
￿  the ratio between the bank credits offer and the  potential demand for them – the degree 
of the credit availability; 
￿  the mechanisms of interest rate formation;  
￿  the relations between banking system and non banking economic subjects;  
￿  the banks position opposite to the monetary authority (taking  into consideration  its 
ruling and supervising capacity  over the commercial banks activities, 
￿  the right to intervene in those activities, and also the importance of re-financing from 
the monetary authority ;  
￿  the relations between the banking sector and the capital market (banks may act just as an 
intermediary or may also buy and sell financial assets on their own behalf);  
￿  the competition: banks operators versus capital market operators (trying to attract as 
many temporary available resources as they can);  
￿  the position of the banks with public owners in the banking system;  
￿  the types of banks, classified using the nature and the specialization degree of their 
activities; 
￿  the system of laws which rules the banking sector activity and its imperfections which 
can affect the “optimality” of this sector; 
￿  the types of financial monetary assets created by the monetary authority and  by the 
commercial banks together with the non banking economic subjects  
￿  the main elements which define the capital market: 
￿  the number of operators; 
￿  the intensity of the capital market participation in the financial intermediation process; 
￿  the concentration of the financial resources offer level on this market; 
￿  the main financial assets traded; 
￿  the complexity of the intermediation process; 
￿  the  financial  assets  return  and  the  stability  of  its  dynamics,  determined  by  the 
fundamental factors of the economic evolution; 
                                                 
3 We preferred the use of this term instead of the term “techno – structure”, but without associate it with some 
connotation  of  value;  the  simple  term  of  “management”  does  not  reflect  strong  enough  the  existence  of  a 
managerial hierarchy and the decisional consequences which are derived from it, in a firm.    5 
￿  the investment risk on this market; 
￿  trading mechanisms characterized by their technical elements and efficiency; 
￿  the characteristics of the system of laws which rules the capital market; 
￿  the operators position in the process of intermediation, offering or demanding resources.  
 
Table 1: The characteristics of the economic systems 
 
  “A” Economy  “B” Economy  “C” Economy 
I. Real sector 
     
  1. Real capital       
      a. Volume   Low  Medium  High 
      b.  The  level  of  technical 
infrastructure development  
Low  Medium  High 
      c.  The  dynamics  of  technical 
progress 
Low  Medium  High 
  2. Real capital return   Low  Medium  High 
  3. Resources       
       a. Volume  Low  Medium  High 
       b. Structure  Inadequate  Medium degree of adequacy  High degree of adequacy 
       c. Allocation mechanisms   Inefficient  Presents some deficiencies  Efficient 
   4. Labour       
       a. Volume  Indeterminate  Indeterminate  Indeterminate 
       b. Professional skills  Low  Medium  High 
       c. Mobility       
         c.1. Intra – sectorial mobility  Low or medium  Medium or high  High 
         c.2.. Inter - sectorial mobility  Low  Medium or high  High 
         c.3. Geographic mobility  Low  Medium or high  High 
      d. Labour offer  Exogenous opposite with the 
nominal wage level 
Partial exogenous opposite with 
the nominal wage level 
Endogen opposite with the 
nominal wage level 
      e. Nominal wage determination  Using centralized negotiation 
mechanisms 
Using partial centralized 
negotiation mechanisms 
Using decentralized negotiation 
mechanisms 
      f.  Organizational  labour 
structures  
“Rigid” behaviour and a strict 
hierarchy; the objective 
function includes the nominal 
wage level and job keeping 
Some behavioural flexibility and 
a certain functional 
decentralization degree; the 
objective function includes also 
other variables 
Pronounced behavioural 
flexibility and a strong 
functional decentralization 
degree; the objective function 
valorising the organization 
ensemble objectives where 
labour is involved 
5. The real sector structure        
    a. Dominant sectors  Hard industry and/or 
agriculture; frequently 
monopole. 
Textile, food industry and 
services; possible monopole or 
“cooperative” oligopoly 
Services and informational sub 
sectors; “perfect” competition or 
“competitive” oligopoly 
    b. Inter-sectorial relations  Rigid and with high 
hierarchies 
Some certain flexibility and a 
medium degree of hierarchies 
Extremely   flexible 
    c. “Progress poles” position   Marginal  In affirmation  Dominant 
6. Extern opening degree   Low  Medium  High 
7. Real assets classification  Simple  Medium level of complexity  Complex 
8. Real assets markets nature   Producers markets  Undetermined  Consumers markets 
9.  The  relations  between  public 
sub- sector and private sub - sector  
 
 
   
  a.  The  participation  in  resources 
allocation 
Marginal for the private 
sector 
In equilibrium  Marginal for the public sector 
  b.  The  position  on  different 
component markets 
Dominance of the public 
sector 
In equilibrium  Dominance of the private sector 
10. Informational asymmetry  Pronounced  Medium  Absent 
11. Investments opportunities  Reduced  Diverse  Highly diversified 
12.  The  main  incomes  of  the 
economic subjects  
Wages  Wages and capital incomes  Wages and capital incomes 
13.  The  decisional  relations 
between  managerial  bureaucracy 
and the capital owners 
The decisions are taken by the 
managerial bureaucracy; even 
in strategic matters the 
decisional power of the 
capital owners is dissipated or 
lower than the other 
There is a certain control 
exercised by the capital owners 
over the managerial activity; the 
main decisions adopted by the 
managerial bureaucracy are 
tactical and operational 
decisions 
There is a certain control 
exercised by the capital owners 
over the managerial activity; the 
main decisions adopted by the 
managerial bureaucracy are 
tactical and operational 
decisions 
II. The public authority       
  1. The bureaucratic machinery  Developed  Medium level of development  Low level 
  2. The fiscal system         6 
      a.  The  fiscal  incomes 
classification 
Primitive  Medium level of complexity  Developed 
      b.  The  prevalent  destination  of 
public expenditures 
Economic  Economic and social  Social 
      c. Efficient  Low  Medium  High 
      D .The fiscal budgetary deficit   Pronounced  Medium  Low 
      e.  The  quasi-fiscal  budgetary 
deficit 
Pronounced  Medium  Low 
3. The relations between executive 
authority and central bank 
Subordination of the central 
bank to the executive 
authority 
Possibilities of executive 
authorities interference in the 
central bank’s activities 
Central bank’s independence 
III. The monetary sector       
  1.  The  classification  of  financial 
intermediaries  
Mostly bank financial 
intermediaries 
Bank and no bank financial 
intermediaries 
High role of no bank financial 
intermediaries 
 2. Banking sector       
  a. Number of components  Undetermined  Undetermined  Undetermined 
  b  The  level  of  bank  activity  
concentration.  
High  Medium  Low 
  c.  The  proportion  of  financial 
resources attracted  
High  Medium  Competitively dependent of the 
resources attracted by the capital 
market 
  d.  The  ratios  between  effective 
credits  supply  and  potential  credits 
demand 
The demand is durable higher 
than the supply 
A temporary exceeding demand 
is possible 
An equilibrium situation 
 e. Interest rate formation  Mostly administrative  Formation mechanism with 
important competitive elements 
Competitive mechanism 
 f.  The  relations  with  economic  no 
bank subjects 
Domination or cooperation 
(mostly in the relations 
between banks and non 
banking subjects with public 
owners) 
In equilibrium  Orientated to the non banking 
subjects needs 
 g.  The  position  opposite  the 
monetary authority 
Dependence  (“ the banks are 
in the Bank”) 
Increased autonomy of the 
commercial banks 
High degree of commercial 
banks autonomy 
h. The position opposite the capital 
market 
Dominance over the capital 
market 
Competitive  Competitive 
i. The position of public owned banks  Dominant  Elements of competition with 
private banks 
Competition with private banks 
j .The risk level  High  Medium  Low 
K Bank services classification  Simple  Medium level of complexity  Complex 
 l. Banks  Universal  Universal and specialized  Universal and specialized 
 m. Bank regulations  Unstable and inefficient 
regulations system 
Regulations stable on ensemble 
elements 
Stable and efficient regulation 
system 
  n.  The  monetary  financial  assets 
types  
Simple  Medium level of complexity  Complex 
3. Capital market       
    a. Number of participants  Low  Medium  High 
    b.  The  proportion  of  attracted 
financial resources 
Low  Medium  Competitively dependent of the 
resources attracted by the 
monetary market 
    C The level of financial resources 
supply concentration  
High  Medium  Low 
   d. The traded financial assets  Simple  Medium level of complexity  Complex 
  e.  The  complexity  of  the 
intermediation process 
Low  Medium  High 
  f.  The  ratios  between  effective 
capital and potential capital demand  
The demand is durable higher 
than the supply 
A temporary exceeding demand 
is possible 
An equilibrium situation 
  g. The financial assets return  Low and fluctuating  Medium with possible 
fluctuations 
High and stabile 
   h.  The  liquidity  of  financial  no 
bank assets  
Low  Medium  High 
  i. Investments   Pronounced  Medium  Low 
  j. Trading mechanisms  Simple, with numerous 
imperfections, with low 
efficiency 
Medium level of complexity and 
efficiency 
Complex and efficient 
 k. Regulations on capital market  Unstable and inefficient 
regulations system 
Regulations stable on ensemble 
elements 
Stable and efficient regulation 
system 
 l.  The  position  of  public  owned 
operators  
Dominant  Elements of competition with 
private operators 
Competition with private 
operators 
   7 
The three economic systems do not correspond to an analytical description of some real 
systems  (from  this  point  of  view  the  proposed  analysis  represents  maybe  more  a  “naïve” 
exercise than a theoretical auto consistent approach).  
But  even  if  we  take  into  consideration  this  aspect,  and  presume  a  direct  and  strong 
correlation between the intensity of the structural blockings which affect an economic system 
functioning and its development level, than we could associate, more or less conventional, three 
situations of economic systems based on the “unplanned” markets functioning, for each one of 
the three situations (we must notice that in the economic real systems a rigorous delimitation of 
the different structural imperfections does not exist  and that some of them can be found in all 
contemporary economies).This taxonomy could allow us to analyze the effects induced by the 
different types of  real  and/or nominal shocks, shocks associated with the economic  growth 
process  or  with the  increase in the  economic evolution dynamics.        
An  “A”  economy  dynamics  is  confronted  with  important  and  persistent  inflationist 
pressures, with an inefficient resources allocation, an unfavourable output evolution and a low 
level of labour occupation.   
The financial resources insufficiency and the inefficient allocation mechanisms represents 
a cause for a frequently manifestation of moral hazard and adverse selection situations. On the 
other  hand,  due  to  the  reduced  producing  performances,  even  if  the  resources  could  be 
sufficient, their use in production is limited, incomplete and less efficient. 
The manifestation of certain real or nominal shocks which act as a determinant for a 
decrease in economic activities results make different economic subjects to try to substitute 
different types of assets. Due to the incipient development level of the financial market, low 
liquidity of the non-monetary financial assets and their high risk, these kinds of assets are not 
considered a direct substitute for a monetary asset. On the other hand, the assets and liabilities 
structure is far away from optimum because the level of the effective holds by some certain 
financial and real assets is lower than the desired one (this means that an exceeding demand not 
necessary manifested exists)  
Concluding, there is no non-monetary asset, which could be seen as a “perfect” money 
substitute,  and  the  liquidity  spectrum  has  numerous  discontinuity  points  (the  substitution 
elasticity  is  non  homogenous  between  different  financial  and  real  assets  types  due  to  the 
functional imperfections and to the positional differences of this assets markets). Economic 
subjects will try, as a result, to compensate the decrease in their financial resources through 
transforming a part of their real or financial assets (which have an exceeding level and low 
transformation costs).  
The aggregation of individual substitution solutions will cause a modification in the level 
of the demand and supply for different types of assets
4. The critical aspect is represented by the 
fact that this demand and supply adjustments does not involve all the times adjustments of the 
relatives assets prices. Because of the imperfection associated with these markets and of the 
frequency of monopoly situations, numerous prices are rigid (more precisely “down” inelastic) 
so the supply does not react through price, at the new demand level. Even more a certitude of a 
supply reaction through quantities does not exist. On the one hand the exceeding demand was 
not  absorbed  for  all  the  complementary  and  substitutable  assets  and  on  the  other  hand  the 
temporary character of the exceeding demand makes the suppliers consider the current demand 
fluctuation as a transitory one. 
Another  problem  is  the  inertial  character  of  current  consumes  goods  (the demand  for 
goods which is not considered away to preserve the value), which leads to a reduced elasticity 
in front of the available current income changes. 
                                                 
4 Real or financial assets which already exist.    8 
As a consequence, a decrease in available nominal and real incomes (current and expected 
ones) causes a reduction in the real effective realized level of the economy, which drops below 
the desired level. The main way of creating economies is investing the temporary available 
resources in the banking system because the financial market is not sufficient developed, the 
financial assets are not diversified enough, the associated risk is extremely high. Under these 
circumstances, the reduction in the economy level combined with the modifications generated 
as a result of transformation processes from real or financial assets in to money, due to the 
decrease in current income level, will determine a reduction of the financial resources attracted 
by the banking system. 
If this situation is accompanied by some modification in the general credits conditions 
(other than the one concerning the interest rate) we  will perceive  a decrease in the  credits 
supply. Concluding, we can say that, at a low economy and credits” abundance” level, the 
effective realized investments level will be situated below the estimated one (we must notice 
that here we speak only about the new investments, from the current period of time, so we do 
not understand through this conclusion the existence of a disinvestments phenomenon; we are 
dealing only with the dropping off some new investments projects). As a result, we will be 
confronted with a decrease in capital goods demand, without a modification of their price, like 
it  could  be  seen  in  the  final  consume  goods  situation.  The  final  point  is  represented  by  a 
reduction in the real output level, compared with its excepted level (not necessary with its level 
from  the  last  period).  Due  to  the  organizational  rigidities  of  the  labour  market  and  to  the 
centralized  negotiation  of  the  nominal  wage,  this  decrease  is  not  accompanied  by  a 
readjustment in the nominal wage level (similar with the other relative prices, the nominal wage 
is “down” rigid) 
We can also notice a stability in capital goods supply characteristics including here the 
psychical and informational capital real return. This happen because the decrease in capital 
goods demand which is not accompanied by a qualitative supply modification, on the one hand 
due to the low level of technical infrastructure development and on the other hand due to the 
absence of a competitive pressure in capital goods field. 
In the same time the mentioned decrease in the resources available for banking system 
will cause a modification in the interest rates level (both active and passive interest rates). But 
the formation of the interest rates is not free, so the commercial banks are not allowed to 
increase as they wish its level which leads to a lower level of the interest rate than the desired 
one.  Under  these  circumstances  the  reduction  in  the  credit  supply  could  be  a  durable  one, 
similar with the investments level decline. 
Parallel with the impact exercised on the relative prices, investments and outputs volume, 
the real and nominal shock affects the financial resources demand: 
￿ through the effects exercised on the current and expected  incomes, and also on the real 
trading volume realized by the economic subjects; 
￿ through the de - correlations between the in and out  expenses and incomes flows and 
through the potential estimation modification concerning the frequency of a exceeding 
expenses level comparing with the incomes level; 
￿ through the reformulation of the wealth structure optimization problem. 
The modification appeared in the relative prices structure as a result of the reformulation 
of  the  wealth  structure  optimization  problem,  the  “perverse”  modification  of  some  relative 
prices due to the transfer of the budgetary “hard” restriction from producers to final consumers, 
the impact of the contra-cyclic economic politics or “preventive inflation” determined by the 
economic subjects which benefits of the informational advantages, can transform the diverse 
shocks which affect the “A” systems functioning in veritable “rocks “ against the economic 
growth. Their absorption implies important social costs.  
   9 
In  a  “B”  economy  the  effect  of  real  and  nominal  shocks  is  much  more diffuse.  The 
typology of real and financial assets and their return are significant   higher than in the “A” 
economy case. Also their risk is lower and some financial asset could be perceived as a direct 
substitute for money. 
If the level of liquid resources is lower than the planed one, the economic subjects will try 
to compensate it also through a decrease of that type of asset which is perceived having similar 
characteristic as money has, not only considering undifferentiated the imperfect liquid assets. 
But the asset and liabilities structure is not optimal because the effective level of some 
real and financial assets is not the desired one (the amplitude of the structural disequilibria is 
lower than in the first case). Reformulating their optimization structure problems, the economic 
subjects will take into account not only these structural disequilibria but also the necessity of an 
arbitrage between the return and the risk of different assets.  
The  re-adjustments  appeared  in  the  different  assets  supply  and  demand  causes 
modifications of their relative prices (even if on some of the markets, the individual prices 
continue to remain “down” rigid) and of the supplied quantities (with the same observation 
about the rigid nature of the supply for some assets) 
Because  the  current  consume  of  goods  has  in  a  “B”  economy  a  more  pronounced 
elasticity in front of the modifications in the current available income level, comparing with a 
“A” economy, a decrease in the available income level (or, more precisely its positioning at a 
lower level than the expected one) can cause a reduction of the current consume (without a 
uniform character of this decrease for all kinds of current consume goods) 
As  a  consequence,  the  decrease  of  the  available  nominal  incomes  (more  exactly, 
principally of the nominal ones, because the stability of some relative prices can cause a lower 
reduction of the general prices level than the reduction of the nominal income level; in this way 
the nominal reduction is accompanied by a real one) causes a compression of the effective 
economy. Its level is inferior in rapport with the desired one; taking into account the fact that 
the decreases in level of consume is lower than the decrease in the income level.  
In this case the economies are created not only using the banking system (mostly by the 
economic subjects with a low or medium level of incomes and a high risk aversion) but also 
using financial markets. This fact will provoke in the same time a diminishing of the resources 
attracted by the banking sector and   a decrease of the financial assets demand, which will 
determine a prices decrease and an interest rate increase.  
Because of the presence of a numerous competitive element in the mechanism of interest 
rate formation, the decrease in the resources attracted by the banking system will be followed 
by an increase of the active interest rate and/or a decrease of the passive interest rate (even if, 
due to the persistence of some administrative elements in interest rate formation, some types of 
interest rates will remain unchanged, which leads to a medium level of the interest rate lower 
than the desired one; the measure of this difference is much more less significant than in an 
“A” case economy and anyway superior to the one from the former period)  
The  interest  rates  increases  combined  with  a  diminution  of  the  available  financing 
resources will provoke a decrease of the credits demand and supply, decrease that could be 
amplified by the general credit condition modifications. In this context, at a lower economy 
volume, an inferior credit “abundance” index and a superior interest rate index, the effective 
investments  volume  will  be  situated  below  the planned  one  (we  speak  here  about  the  new 
investments but also about a disinvesting process). The decrease in the current investments 
volume will be accompanied by a diminution of the capital goods demand (similar with the 
final consume goods) without a modification in the same degree of their prices (in fact it is 
possible that some of this prices to be “down” inelastic). On this causal chain we will also find 
a real output decrease compared with the planned one (not necessary compared to the former 
one). Because of the decentralized components present in the wages mechanisms, the labour   10 
demand has a higher level of elasticity   comparing with the nominal wage level. The intra and 
inter- sectorial mobility of the labour demand, the more pronounced character of the geographic 
mobility, make possible the apparition of some re-adjustments of the labour market along with 
the decrease in output level, even if this re-adjustments will continue to have a partial character. 
Also,  the  decrease  of  the  capital  goods  demand  could  be  accompanied  by  a  qualitative 
modification of the supply, due to the manifestation of some competitive pressures in the sector. 
In  this  way  the  capital  goods  supply  characteristics  (including  the  real  return  of  the 
informational  and  physic  capital)  will  suffer  transformations,  but  these  ones  will  not  have 
sufficient  strength  to  determine  modifications  able  to  compensate  the  impact,  which  the 
decrease in investments available resources causes on their volume. 
The impact of the real and/or nominal shocks in a “B” economy is similar with the one in 
an “A” economy (through the effects exercised on the current and expected incomes, and also 
on the real trading volume realized by the economic subjects; through the de - correlations 
between  the  in  and  out  expenses  and  incomes  flows  and  through  the  potential  estimation 
modification  concerning  the  frequency  of  a  exceeding  expenses  level  comparing  with  the 
incomes level; through the reformulation of the wealth structure optimization problem ). The 
only things which are different are the intensity of these effects, lower as amplitude but with a 
less  contradictory  character  and  manifestation  of  the  interest  rate  level  modifications.  But 
globally,  the  nature  of  these  effects  will  remain  undetermined.  More  than  that,  due  to  the 
remaining informational asymmetry between different categories of economic subjects and to a 
positional asymmetry, their reaction opposite to the exogenous decrease of the money supply 
induced by the economic system is still no-homogenous, but phenomena as the transfer effect 
or the “preventive inflation” will have a lower amplitude than in an “A” economy. 
“C”  economies  are  characterized  by  a  lack  of  structural  rigidity.  The  different 
imperfections  which  affect  the  market  functionality  have  a  minimal  intensity;  the  financial 
market is “mature” and the competitive pressure, the efficient resources allocation mechanisms, 
the rapid dynamics of technical progresses make the exceeding demand to be easily eliminated. 
The supply adaptation is dually realized on all markets, through price but also through quantity.  
The liquidity spectrum is uniform (with a single discontinuity point) and the variety of the 
asset situated at “left” of this point is complex (in other words there are a numerous types of 
financial assets which are perceived as a direct money substitute due to their high liquidity level 
and their low risk). In this conditions, the exogenous decrease of the liquid available resources 
caused by the compression of generating economic activity will be compensated in the first 
place through a reduction of the financial assets with similar characteristics with money and just 
after, if this sort of assets are not sufficient enough, through the reduction of other assets (this 
substitution process is ruled by an arbitrage between risk and return) 
The  re-adjustments  in  the  assets  supply  and  demand  determine  relative  prices 
modifications but also quantity supply modifications (but we must notice that the ratio between 
the movements dynamics is ex-ante undetermined; so, we will assume that the adjusting using 
quantities is realized before the adjustment through prices, without criticize this)  
 Because the goods current consume is “perfect” elastic comparing with the changes in 
current  income  level,  the  compression  of  this  income  generates  a  decrease  of  the  current 
consume  which  is  uniform  for  all  goods  types.  It  has  lower  amplitude  than  the  income 
compression and leads to a decrease in the effective economy. In this way, real economy is 
inferior to the expected, desired one. 
Taking into consideration the fact that in this case the economies are created not only 
using the banking system but also using financial markets, this will provoke in the same time a 
diminishing of the resources attracted by the banking sector and a decrease of the financial 
assets demand, which will determine a prices decrease and an interest rate increase.    11 
Due to the freely and competitively interest rates formation, they will grow (even in the 
banking system) until they will reach the real level (which   reflects the new ratio between the 
financial resources supply and demand). 
The increases of the interest rates, the compression of the available financial resources 
(parallel with the modification of the general credit condition) could cause a reduction of the 
credit demand and supply. At a low economy and “abundance” index volume corroborated with 
a high interest rate level, the effective investments volume will be situated at a lower level than 
the  planned  one  (we  speak  here  about  the  new  investments  but  also  about  a  disinvesting 
process). 
The decrease in current investments volume will be accompanied by a decrease of the 
capital goods demand and by adjustments of their prices and quantities. We will find also a real 
output  decrease  comparing  with  the  planed  one.  Because  of  the  decentralized  components 
present in the wages mechanisms, the labour demand and supply are perfectly elastic opposite 
to the real wage level, which determine “complete” labour re-adjustments. The decrease of 
capital goods’ demand (because of the supply competition on the capital goods market) goes 
along  with  its  qualitative  modification.  In  this  way  the  characteristics  of  the  capital  goods 
supply  (including  the  informational  and  physic  return)  will  be  modified.  In  this  case  these 
changes are able to compensate the impact, which the reduction of the available investments 
resources causes over its volume. Anyway the investments   volume has a relevant elasticity 
comparing with these parameters dynamics. 
The real and nominal shocks cause a decrease of the money demand through the effects 
induced by the structural modification and through the interest rate (this one has not always the 
same  amplitude  with  the  decrease  of  money  supply,  due  to  the  inertial  character  of  the 
anticipation  made  by  economic  subjects).  Because  the  informational  and  positional 




01 S :  The  budget  deficit  decrease  as  the  economic  systems  is  closed  to  the  model  of  “C” 
economies because: 
01 S : The involvement of the state in the functioning of the economical systems decreases as 
these systems translate their structures from the characteristics of to “A” economies to the ones 
specifically to “C” economies. 
02 S : The ability of economic systems in absorbing real and/or nominal shocks induced by the 
economic growth processes increases as well as these systems pass structural modifications 
which transforms them from “A” economies to “C” economies.  
 
3. Institutional characteristics of the economic systems: how the social mandate is 
exercised and how growth could be sustained  
 
Any structural performances an economic system would have, given the way resources 
are created, distributed and redistributed using the global social utility function, could not result 
only from the intrinsic  market mechanisms. Due to the specific preferences concerning the 
incomes volume and structure, their allocation, risk aversion and also because of the different 
capacities of the economic subjects, which are more or less able to participate at the economic 
processes, a set of “rules of the game” which allows social mediation is definitely needed. If we 
accept  this  need,  the  institutions  could  be  considered  “the  rules  of  the  game  in  a  society”   12 
(NORTH [1990; p.3]). They allow the human activities to be structured in social, political and 
economic mean. In the mean time, the institutional design of a society is a critical parameter for 
the nature and quality of the governance. As EVANS [1995; p.10-12] has noticed:” States are 
not generic. They vary dramatically in their internal structure and relations to society. Different 
kinds of state structures create different capacities for action. Structures define the range of 
roles that the state is capable of playing. Outcomes depend both on whether the role fit the 
context and on how well they are executed. […] The trick is to establish a connection between 
developmental impact and the structural characteristics of states – their internal organization 
and relation to society.” 
A  critical  distinction  should  be  done  between  the  political  institutions  and  civil 
institutions. The institutions to the first category are the elements of the political systems and 
represent the ensemble of public (central and local) and “semi”-public (e.g. political parties) 
authorities.  The  institutions  to  the  second  category  are  generated  by  the  civil  society  and 
represent “private” associative forms
5 .  
The impact of each type of institutions on the budget deficit could be explained: 
- By their influence on the state’s importance in the distributional processes; 
- By their influence on the private distributional coalitions. 
More exactly, if the influence of the politic institutions is strong and, correlative, the civil 
society’s institutions are weak structured (the social life is dominated by the public authorities 
and / or political organizations), the distributional processes are controlled by the state and the 
budget deficit are higher that the ones who occurs in situations in which the powers and the 
autonomy of the civil institutions are significant. From this point of view, the budget deficit is 
the prices of a higher relative importance of the political life in respect to the private one. 
But how important is in fact this cleavage between the “public” / “private” institutions? 
Isn’t it clearer to say that all the institutions that are in fact distributional coalitions exercised 
an  impact  on  budget  deficit?  In  our  opinion,  these  theses  are  not  contradictory:  the 
distributional coalitions tend to reduce the capacity of society to promote the structural and 
functional changes and the “operational speed” of the resources reallocation mechanisms and 
thus tend to reduce the economic growth. In the same time, this impact is asymmetric for the 
political and civil institutions: the importance of the public allocation of resources decreases as 
the importance of the “private” sphere involvement in the allocation processes increase. 
Also,  a  distinction  between  the  formal  institutions  (rules,  norms,  procedures)  and  the 
informal  ones  (unwritten  conduit  code  which  makes  the  formal  rule  understandable, 
supplements and sometimes even replaces them) is very useful. Both institutions are creating a 
framework in which there are inserted the economic systems, destined to support and to correct 
the way the systems work.  
Using the analysis proposed by RODRIK [2000] we consider that this sort of support -
institutions could be classified as follows: 
1)  institutions for property rights; 
2)  regulatory institutions; 
3)  institutions for macroeconomic stabilization; 
4)  institutions for social insurance; 
5)  institutions for conflicts management. 
1. Property rights - an adequate property rights system represents an essential incentive 
for the economic innovation processes: the economic subjects are assuming the risks associated 
to those processes only if they have the control over the result. 
                                                 
5 These institutions covers a large spectrum of private interests but only a limited numbers of them, like syndicates, 
professional associations, lobby groups of producers and consumers etc., really matters for the present topics.   13 
RODRIK [2000; p.5] said:” Note that the key word is „control” rather than „ownership”. 
Formal property rights do not count for much is they do not confer control rights. By the same 
token, sufficiently strong control rights may do the trick even in the absence of formal property 
rights”. The de facto use of the control right is much more diffuse than the use of the property 
right  and  depends  not  only  of  the  formal  regulations  but  also  of  the  behavioural  typology 
associated with the implementation and realization practices, practices which are considered 
social acceptable. 
It should be noticed that the property rights can not be considered as “absolute”. There is a 
“frontier” which limits the action sphere of each individual economic subject and the societies 
are trying to impose different limits in “frontier areas” where this sphere is intersected with the 
one characteristic for other subjects. The societies limit the property rights by subordinating 
them to the “public interest”: the global social utility maximization is prevalent comparing with 
the maximization of the individual utilities. The “exact” definition of the “public interest” is 
different from society to society, from period to period. 
2.  Regulatory  institutions  -  behind  the  ideal  model  of  the  “perfect  market,  the  real 
markets are characterized by numerous types of imperfections. In practice the markets ”fail” 
due to the natural, technical or informational monopoly situations, to some trading costs, which 
stop the innovation and other non-monetary externalities internalization, and not in the last 
place due to the informational asymmetry, which generates moral hazard and adverse selection 
and to the systemic and non-systemic shocks which affect their normal functionality.  
To  compensate  these  market’s  “failures”,  a  complex  ensemble  of  institutions  able  to 
create a frame of rules and prudential supervision for the real and financial assets markets and 
to preserve the competitive character of these markets, is extremely necessary. 
A critical aspect could be the interventions amplitude. More precisely a “balance” in their 
modulation is necessary:” too low” amplitude can induce the intervention inefficiency. Per a 
contrario  ”too  pronounced”  amplitude  can  generate  perturbations  of  the  natural  market 
mechanisms. Moreover the dimension of the interventions must suit with the structural specific 
characteristics and to maintain a minimal character if the structural configuration is good. If not, 
and we are in the presence of some profound structural deficiencies and /or in a process of 
accelerate economic growth, a public coordination of the private sector activity could appear as 
desirable (the example of some countries from South-East Asia, in ’60 and ’70 could be a proof 
that justify this assumption)  
Finally we must also notice the importance of a correct schedule in time of this kind of 
interventions. The realized connection between public and private sphere, social efficient at the 
beginning, could become dysfunctional if initial conditions are changing.     
Summarizing,  we  can  affirm  that,  similar  with  the  institution  for  property  rights,  the 
“optimum”  institutional  arrangements  involved  by  ruling  and  prudential  supervising  of  the 
markets is a variable of time and geographic areas. 
3.  Institutions  for  macroeconomic  stabilization  -  the  auto-stabilization  market’s 
mechanisms  do  not  have  a  “complete”  efficiency:  the  de  –  correlations  between  real  and 
financial asset flows can be a result of some external shocks but moreover a result of the way 
different system’s components, and the whole system, is functioning. 
The exceeding demand and supply could become persistent; the financial infrastructure 
could have a limited capacity of absorbing the real and nominal shocks, the incomplete and 
asymmetrical information could lead to incorrect consume economy or investment decisions. 
For this reason, a fiscal and monetary authority able to conceive and implement anti-cyclical 
politics with stabilization purpose is a real necessity. 
4. Institutions for social insurance - a continuous structural-functional transformation 
process characterizes the modern economic systems.   14 
The environment where the daily economic processes are realized, the mechanism, the 
written  and  unwritten  rules  become  profound  instable.  The  labour,  the  technologies,  the 
financial resources, the organizational structures, the ideas, the values and the inter-personal 
relationship transgress more and more rapidly the physical and mental borders. The impact of 
those transformations on the level of economic growth depends of the risk aversion of all the 
economic  subjects  involved.  These  risks  cannot  be  managed  in  a  traditional  fashion, 
characteristic for more  stable economic systems, where  groups and  collectivises with small 
dimensions and strong connections between members   dominate the social life.  
The modern risk management mechanisms have a combined nature. The public authority 
takes over and socially distributes a part of the risks, which the individuals must to face off. The 
individuals also develop alternative protection systems, independently or in a partnership with 
public social insurance systems. These actions have as a result a mix between the individual 
firm’s practices and the practices specific for the public authorities that have a large area of 
extension. 
One could notice that the public sector implication in the social  risks  management is 
extended behind the distribution of fiscal resources in the favour of different social categories. 
This involvement frequently includes a complex system of rules, norms and regulations meant 
for the high-risk activities. This system covers a variety of aspects starting from the lifetime 
employment practices and continuing with consumer protection and environment conservation. 
The “safety mechanisms” contribute to the social disparity diminishing and, in the same 
time, stimulate the “economic programs” of the high-risk private subjects, which are capable to 
generate socio-economic innovation and relative social advantages. The” safety mechanisms” 
can also help diminishing the “resistance in front of the changes”. This opposition is frequently 
manifested in the economic systems characterized by rapid structural transformations but using 
these  insurance  methods  the  social  consensus  in  favour  of  this  kind  of  transformations  is 
obtained easier.  
5.  Institutions  for  conflict  management  -  different  cleavages  types  transgress  the 
modern societies. The “demarcation lines” between the divers social groups and categories does 
not result just from the primary distribution and redistribution of the economic activities out-
put, being also equally determined by the cultural, ethnic and political factors. Or, as RODRIK 
[2000;  p.12]  said:  ”Social  conflict  is  harmful  both  because  it  diverts  resources  from 
economically productive activities and because it discourages such activities by the uncertainty 
it generates”. 
A  pronounced  asymmetry  of  economic  activities  results  from  the  social  coordination 
failure in obtaining and using those results. This asymmetry implies social breakings, which 
have a larger associated cost than the one involved by financing an ensemble of institutions able 
to manage social conflicts.  
Some examples of institutions could be: a legal system which respects the social ethics, 
political  institutions  which  allow  the  representation  of  all  interest  groups,  independent 
professional structures, minority structures. . 
One could notice that they have a “levelling “action. On the one hand, they limit the 
positive result of the “economic game” (through the social redistribution) and on the other hand 
contribute  to  the  loss  limitation  (through  multiple  compensation  forms).  Consequently,  the 
existence of this kind of institutions increases the probability of fairness and cooperation in the 
“economic game”, which lead to a higher output than a non-cooperative one. 
For a more accurate picture, it could be noticed that on should pay a special attention to 
all the types of institutions, which are acting like distributional coalitions
6. The critical point is 
                                                 
6 It is almost useless to mention that, in this point, we have to pay a heavy tribute to Olson’s masterpiece The Rise 
and Decline of Nations. In fact, the entire debate about the role of the institutions in the economic development 
process was “trigged out” for use after the lecture of this book.   15 
that such institutions are able to influence the allocation and reallocation mechanism; the higher 
their power is, the lower the efficiency of these mechanisms is and higher the transactional 
costs are which occur in the current evolution of the economical systems. Also, any increase in 
the number of the distributional coalitions leads to an increase in the power and attributions of 
the  public  authorities  and,  more  generally,  exercises  a  substantial  impact  on  the  state 
architecture. 
The institutions ensemble represents a markets complement and an “environment” for the 
public actions. These institutions are, in the last instance corrections mechanism of the intrinsic 
dysfunctions, which assures the social coordination of the economic processes, at the minimal 
level.  
 
As a consequence: 
o I : The higher the quality of private institutions is, the lower is the budget deficit because: 
01 I :  The  higher  the  quality  and  importance  of  the  formal  and  informal  social-cultural 
institutions of the civil society is, the lower profile is the role of the state and thus the budget 
deficit; 
 
02 I : The higher the quality of the complementary market institutions is, the more durable the 
character of the economic growth is and lower the social costs are. 
 
 
3. The socio-cultural paradigm: how the social mandate is formulated and what values are 
assigned to the economic growth 
 
 
By  paradigm  we  understand  the  dominant  mental  collective  model,  which  makes  the 
distinction between a society and the other. This paradigm represents a societal integration 
factor that supplies commune values and purposes for society members. Also, it represents the 
subject of some learning and transferring inter-generation processes, modifying itself lent, in 
“long  cycles”.  The  paradigm  is  the  generator  factor  of  the  institutional  frame,  which 
characterizes  the  society  configuration.  The  paradigm  and  the  institution  generated  by  it, 
significantly  influence  the  economic  activity  dynamics.  It  is  sufficient  to  notice  that  the 
economic subjects guide their decisions using a set of characteristic values; that the economic 
politics are influenced by  this values in the interventions realized through the processes of 
distribution and redistribution of the economic activities resources and results (the predominant 
position  of  the  equality/inequality  couple  significantly  influences  the  public  authorities 
involvement in the redistribution process)   
In  the  same  time,  the  economic  development  influences  the  institutions  and  also  the 
paradigm.  For  example  the  significantly  bureaucratized  institutions  that  characterize  the 
industrial society, has known a large decline in the post industrial society, characterized by a 
highly  specialized  labour  market,  an  important  level  of  mobility  and  a  evolution  to  the 
“qualitative”  aspect,  due  to  the  increase  in  the  per  capita  income  level  and  its  relatively 
equilibrate distributions. 
 The dissolution of the “real” socialist system had also happened, inter alia in a point of 
maximum bureaucracy inefficiency in the planed economy management. 
It  is  absolutely  necessary  to  notice  that  the  way  economic  dynamics  influence  the 
paradigm and its institution’s dynamics (if we take into account the different level of inertia that 
characterizes the socio-cultural / economic dynamics) is not clear enough. So, as we already 
have said before the paradigm presents “by definition” an accentuated inertial character more 
pronounced than the one that characterizes economic dynamics. Despite all these, due to the   16 
assimilation of the cultural values by a “learning process”, the existence of some modifications 
(most probably, in “normal conditions” initiated first at the institution’s level and after at the 
paradigms’) in the same generation as a result of economic context changes between the social 
start  of  one  generation  and  the  social  “maturity”  of  the  other,  is  perfectly  possible.  More 
precisely if we admit the scarcity hypothesis: the highest subjective utility is attributed to the 
good with a manifested exceeding demand, than the satisfying of “A” good demand (“A” good 
has a deficient supply at the beginning of the cultural” learning process”) and the apparition of a 
exceeding demand for “B” good during this process, could cause a movement from the values 
associated to the “A” goods to the values associated to the “B” goods (for example from” 
material goods” to “spare time”) (in  the terminology used by INGLEHART[1997] this process 
is equivalent with a transformation from materialism to post-materialism) 
An important consequence of this approach consist in the fact that it could be postulated 
the thesis that any shift in the paradigm will induce a significant and durable change in the 
“parameters” of the global social utility function. Thus, the changes in paradigm will affect the 
role and functions of the state not only in an indirect manner, via the economic growth, but also 
direct, via the (re) formulation of the mandate, which is entrusted to the state by the society.  
In this case, if we taking into account the 
3 1 H H -  hypothesis, we can postulate a direct 
connexion between the configurations of the mental architecture of a society and the state’s 
role. 
Summarizing: 




















Figure 1 reflects the relations between paradigm, institutions, economic dynamic and the 
role of state and is highly similar with the one presented by JONG [2001; p.41]. Despite of this 
fact,  there  are  two  fundamental  distinctions:  (i)  the  use  of  “paradigm”  term  instead  of  the 
“cultural values” term  (justified in our opinion by the “stronger” sense of “mental model” 
incorporated  in  the  first  one  comparing  with  the  second  one  that  suggest  more”  shared 
attitudes”
7; (ii) the consideration of a feed – back relation between institutions and paradigm (if 
                                                 
7 An interesting definition for the culture as „shared values” is, for instance, the definition given in KROEBER and 
KLUCKHOHN [1952] (cited by ADLER [1986]). According to this definition, culture consists of patterns, explicit 
and implicit of and for behaviours acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of 
Institutions 
·  Formal 





The role of state 
(budget deficit) 
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an  institutional  system  is  exogenous  constitute  it  could  influence  in  the  end  the  receptor- 
paradigm; the pro and contra arguments could be synthesized using the approaches specific to 
one recurrent theme in dominant paradigm in Romania, the one of “forms without fond”: the 
initial creation of some “forms” maintained functional and “efficient” ends by influencing the 
“fond” which did not generated them, just receipted them). 
It is interesting to remark the possibility of creating equivalence between the paradigm 
components and the factors used by HOFSTEDE [1980]
8 to explain the cultural differences 
(using some limitation in their sphere and content).These factors are
9 : 
￿   Power Distance (PD); 
￿  Individualism (I); 
￿  Masculinity (M); 
￿  Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI). 
PD deals with the degree of acceptance of the non-equal power distribution in society. In 
the societies with a higher level of PD, this distribution will have a more pronounced character, 
with a positive correlation between this factor  and the concentration of the political power 
(HOFSTEDE [1980; p.97-98,106])
10. 
In societies characterized by a high UAI level, the refuse of decisional incertitude will 
generate an increased recurs to the public authorities for its dispersion and orientation to a 
minimum level; as a consequence, the power and competences sphere of these authorities will 
be larger and more precisely established than in those societies with a low UAI level, which 
will accentuate the individual competences of the economic subjects and the limitation of the 
public role to a small set of public utilities supply. 
M does not imply the discrimination of the cultural values on sexes, trying to reflect some 
fundamental values shared by all society members. More precisely, it is considered that the 
“masculine”  societies  are  those  where  the  dominant  values  are  connected  with  the  social 
affirmation, the material results and the decisional freedom. In this conditions the performance 
is  measured  using  the  terms  of  reaching  and  maintaining  a  reference  social  status  and  the 
material achievements are considered more important that the spiritual ones. In opposition, the 
“feminine” societies have as dominant values: the equality, the solidarity and the consensus, the 
social tension avoidance, the centralization of the social-economic trades and the conservation 
or the spiritual values, tided to the “quality of life” and to the inter-human relationships. 
                                                                                                                                                             
human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., 
historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, 
be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of future action. 
Culture is: 
- Something that is shared by all or almost all members of some social group; 
- Something that the older members of the group try to pass on to the younger 
members; and 
- Something (as in the case of morals, laws and customs) that shapes behavior, or structures one' s perception of the 
world. 
Our vision is much closer to HOFSTEDE [1991] who defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind 
which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another”. Like him, we emphasizes that 
that culture is learned, not inherited. 
 
8 Realized in 1968-1973 starting from approximately 66 non-socialist countries, this study collected information 
from more than 117000 forms, completed by the IBM employees in this countries  
9  For  this  analyzes  purposes,  the  main  advantage  in  using  these  factors  is  the  quantification  of  the  relevant 
elements,  which could be used, in an empirical approach of the  mentioned thesis.  The factors interpretation 
realized here is larger that the one strictly derived from this study. 
10 DIP is formal definite as follows: “ the distance between a superior B and a subordinate S in a hierarchies 
represent the difference between the measure  B can determine S behavior and the measure S can determinate B 
behavior  (HOFSTEDE[1980; p.22]).   18 
Finally, I deal with the acceptance/rejections of the individual responsibilities in front of 
the social reference group (family, social category, nation) 
Discussion of the relevance and the limits of these concepts exceed this paper framework. 
We consider that taking them into consideration and using them to characterize three types of 
paradigm, characteristic for three types of societies, could be useful: 
￿  “X” society  (closed society); 
￿  “Y” society (semi-opened society); 
￿  “Z” society (opened society). 
More precisely: 
 
Table 2: The characteristic of the different paradigms 
 
  “X”  “Y”  “Z” 
PD 
Reduced  Medium  Pronounced 
I  Reduced  Medium  Pronounced 
M  Reduced  Medium  Pronounced 
UAI  Pronounced  Medium  Reduced 
 
Closed societies are characterized by the tendency (at least formal shown) of attenuation 
at  the  unequal  power  distribution  level,  by  a  pronounced  collectivism,  by  promoting  the 
“feminine  “values  (searching  for  consensus  and  not  for  competition)  and  by  a  pronounced 
incertitude and risk aversion. 
In semi-opened societies all these parameters have medium values; the opened societies 
valorise  more  the  acceptance  of  the  unequal  power  distribution,  as  “natural”  status,  the 
individualism and the social affirmation, the performance and the material result, the incertitude 
acceptance as a status, which could generate action opportunities. 
It  is  interesting  to  remark  that,  from  a  dynamic  perspective,  the  different  possible 
combinations  between  the  mentioned  economies  and  paradigm  place  the  socio-economic 
systems  in  three  relatively  distinct  zones  opposite  to  a  certain  “equilibrium”  status  (we 
understand by this the absence of any social changes, in other words the tendency of actual 
configuration perpetuation, in the economic structures area and also in the institutions one; we 
do not attribute a “positive” value to a status like this which represents just a socio-economic 
“frozen“ dynamics situation and/or the absence of a motivation to realize  major change of the 
economic structures and institutions) (table 3): 
￿ Area I (near the equilibrium); 
￿ Area II (the intermediary area); 
￿ Area III (far away from the equilibrium). 
 
Table 3: The socio-economic systems positioning  
under the paradigm-structure couple impact 
 





"Y"  “Z” 
“A”  Area I  Area II  Area III 
“B”  Area II  Area II  Area II 
“C”  Area III  Area II  Area I 
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Because of its characteristics, an “A” economy can serve as a structural-functional base 
for a closed society. The supports for a performance increase through a superior risks and social 
inequality acceptance, which is normally generated in the first stages of the economic growth, is 
situated at a reduced level. As a consequence, the motivation for the institutional modification 
able to generate a superior economic performance will be insufficient for starting some social 
innovation processes; the accent is pointed on the status quo and social certitude maintaining, 
sacrificing the economic system efficiency.  
In contrast a “C” economy needs some social conditions specific for the opened societies; 
if an institutional gap exists it will cause an intense adjustment process, meant to assure the 
concordance between the constitutive values of the specific paradigm and the way economic 
mechanism and structure function.  
The crucial implication for our debate consists in the fact that in the each type of the 
socio-economic systems there is assigned a different role of state and thus the type and the 
magnitude of its activities is different. Synthetically, it could be formulated the thesis that more 
far from equilibrium is a society, a more larger role is attributed to the state and more important 
is  the  implication  of  the  public  authorities  in  the  “normal”  distribution  and  also  in  the 
redistributive process. 
 
In consequence, it could be presumed that: 
PD C1 : The budget deficit is larger in the countries with a higher PD because: 
PD C 01 : The budget deficit is more important in the countries were PD is more pronounced due 
to the fact that the public authorities tend to act more frequently in an authoritarian manner 
and to involve in a larger spectrum of social and economic issues;   
PD C11 : The economic dynamic is less accelerated and auto-sustained in those countries where 
PD is more pronounced as a result of an “inefficient” institutional infrastructure; 
UAI C2 : The budget deficit is larger in the countries with a higher UAI because: 
UAI C02 : The budget deficit is more important in the countries were UAI is more pronounced 
due to the fact that the appeal to the state intervention in the management of the economic and 
social risks is more frequently; 
 
UAI C12 :  The  economic  dynamic  is  less  accelerated  and  insufficient  auto-sustained  in  the 
countries with pronounced UAI due to the tendency to select economic programs with low 
associated risk but also with a lower yield; 
M C3 : The budget deficit may be (even if this is not obligatory) larger in the countries with a 
higher M as a result of two different sets of effects: 
M C 03 : The budget deficit is more pronounced in the countries with a higher M due to the fact 
that  the  claims  for  the  establishment’s  proof  of  “efficiency”  (especially  in  some  particular 
domains) are more frequently;  
 
M C13 : By the economic cleavages accentuation, the economic dynamic may be (even if this is 
not obligatory) less auto-sustained in countries with a less pronounced M; 
I C 4 : The budget deficit may be (even if this is not obligatory) lower in the countries with a 
higher I as a result of two complementary sets of effects: 
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I C04 : In the countries with an more important I, the autonomy of the civil society in the respect 
of the state is more pronounced and thus the state role and, consequently, the budget deficit is 
more reduce; 
I C14 : In the countries with a high level ofI , the economic dynamic may be (even if this is not 
obligatory) more accelerated. 
 
5. Benchmarks results 
 
5.1. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The  structural  and  institutional  aspects  are,  at  least  partially,  captured  by  using  the 
Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index. This index measures the degree of economic 
freedom present in five major areas: 
￿ Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes and Enterprises; 
￿ Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights; 
￿ Access to Sound Money; 
￿ Freedom to Exchange with Foreigners; 
￿ Regulation of Credit, Labour, and Business. 
The components of Area 1 indicate the extent of country’s reliance on the freedom of 
individual economic subjects’ choices and power of deregulated markets, by measuring the 
intensity  of  the  substitution  effect  between  the  private  resources  allocation  and  the  public 
expenditures, the extent of using private rather than public enterprises to produce goods and 
services and the level of taxes on economic resources in the redistribution process. 
 Area 2 deals with the key ingredients of the legal system which is compatible with the 
economic freedom such as rule of law,” security” of property rights, an independent judiciary, 
and an impartial court system. 
The Area 3 treats the subject of the financial stability. The components of this Area are 
correlated with the consistency of monetary policy (and of monetary authorities) with long-term 
price stability. They also measure the easy use degree of other currencies via domestic and 
foreign banks. 
The elements of Area 4 are designed to reflect a wide variety of restraints that affect 
international exchanges. These include tariffs, quotas, hidden administrative restrains, exchange 
rate and capital controls. In order to get a high rating in this area, a country must have low 
tariffs,  a  large  external  trade  sector,  efficient  customs  administration,  a  freely  convertible 
currency, and few controls on capital.  
The Area 5 reflects the conditions of the domestic credit market (the banks ownership, the 
commercial  banks  sector  competition,  the  credit  extension,  the  avoidance  of  interest  rate 
controls and regulations), the characteristics of the labour markets (minimum wages, dismissal 
regulations, centralized wage setting, extensions of union contracts to non-participating parties, 
unemployment  benefits,  and  conscription),  and  the  regulation  of  business  activities  (price 
controls, administrative conditions for new businesses, government bureaucracy, import and 
export permits, business licenses, tax assessments etc.). 
These areas cover some of the elements listed in table 1 (especially large parts from I.4, 
I.6,  I.9,  II.1,  II.2,  III.1,  III.2)  and  describe  the  property  rights  and  the  architecture  of  the 
regulatory institutions. Thus, the index could be used as an acceptable proxy for the structural 
and  institutional  design  of  the  considered  economies.  In  table  it  is  shown  the  descriptive 
statistics of the index. These statistics suggest that there are not major breakdowns over the time   21 
in the sample, and also reflects the important differences in the degree of economic freedom 
between the countries
11. 
The data for the paradigm’s components are from HOFSTEDE [1980] and they cover a 
smaller  sub-sample  of  countries  (27)  (S.II)  for  the  same  period.  Table  describes  the 
corresponding statistics of the four factors considered
12. Despite the limited observations, all the 
three type of societies are included in this sub-sample.  
The role and importance of the civil society institutions is indirectly estimated by using 
the Freedom in the World data, which measures freedom by assessing two broad categories: 1) 
political rights and 2) civil liberties. As is defined by FREEDOM HOUSE [2003]: “Political 
rights enable people to participate freely in the political process. This includes the right to vote 
and compete for public office and to elect representatives who have a decisive vote on public 
policies”. Also: “Civil liberties include the freedom to develop opinions, institutions, and 
personal autonomy without interference from the state”. 
The Political Rights (PR) index consists in a “checklist” of various aspects from areas 
like
13: 
· Electoral Process; 
· Political Pluralism and Participation; 
· Functioning of Government. 
The Civil Liberties (CL) index deals with: 
· Freedom of Expression and Belief; 
· Associational and Organizational Rights; 
· Rule of Law; 
· Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights. 
We  just  simply  suppose  that  if  the  Political  Rights  are  less  or  equally  defined  and 
exercised that the Civil Liberties then the civil institutions are more or equally important that 
the political ones. 
 
5.2. Results 
The  first  step  of  the  empirical  test  represents  an  attempt  to  estimate  the  following 
equation: 
) 1 ( it it t it EFW bd e a b + + =  
where 
it bd  is the weight of budget deficit in GDP for country  iand  it EFW is the level of 
Economic Freedom of the World index.  
The core equation (1) encapsulates  0 S and  0 I  both, and cannot distinguish between the 
individual contributions of the structural and institutional determinants of the dynamic output. 
Thus, its relevance is limited by an analytical weakness, so the results can count only for the 
global impact of these determinants.    
Before we discuss the results, it is useful to look at a simple bi-variable relationship between 
budget deficit and economic freedom. 
                                                 
11 It should be noticed that the countries are ranked by the EFW as follow: free (score: 1-1.99), mostly free (score: 
2-2.99), mostly unfree (score: 3-3.99) and repressed (score: 4-5). 
12 The implicit hypothesis is:  there are no paradigm’s changes from the period of HOFSTEDE analysis to the 
reference period for this paper. In our opinion, this could be considered as a reasonable hypothesis, taking into 
account the “long term” inertia of the socio-cultural evolutions. 
13 Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of “Free,” “Partly 
Free,” or “Not Free.” Those whose ratings average 1-2.5 are considered Free, 3-5.5 Partly Free, and 5.5-7 Not 
Free. 
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Figure 2 shows the scatter plot for the sample S.I. countries and suggests that there is a 
consistent  positive  correlation  between  economic  dynamic  and  the  degree  of  economic 
freedom. This positive correlation is confirmed by the simple OLS regression of equation (1) 
reported in Table 9. The sign of  EFW is as expected and statistically significant: countries with 
a larger economic freedom (with less structural deficiencies and a better quality of institutions) 
are likely to benefit from a positive dynamic of output. The descriptive statistics of ordinary 
residuals are shown in Table 10 and suggest that these residuals are “close” to zero but are not 
entirely normally distributed.  
Of course, for a number of reasons (reverse causality, omitted variables bias etc.) the 
above relationship cannot be considerate as an accurate one. But it could be seen as a first proof 
for  the  thesis  of  the  existence  of  a  connection  between  the  economic  freedom  and  budget 
deficit. 
In order to complete the analysis for the institutional factors, the second step consists in a 
check  for  the  impact  of  the  political  freedom  on  the  budget  deficit  embedded  in  the  next 
equation: 
) 2 ( it it it t it CL PR bd e l a b + + + =  
where PR stands for the “political rights” and CL  for the “civil liberties”. 
The results are shown in Table 11. There are some peculiar aspects of these results. For 
instance,  the  absolute  level  of  the  parameters  suggests  that  the  “civil  liberties”  are  more 
important for the budget deficit that the “political rights”. In the same time, it is interesting to 
note the signs of the parameters: an increase of the “political rights” (a decrease of the level 
ofPR) leads to an augmentation of the budget deficit. In other words, if the political structures 
are more diversified and stronger and the different public and “semi”-public authorities have 
more  balanced  powers,  their  capacities  to  influence  the  dimensions  and  structures  of  the 
reallocation processes are much significant. Also, an increase of the civil society autonomy in 
respect to the public / political sphere (a decrease of the level of CL) will induce a decrease of 
the budget deficit as a consequence of the complementary reduction of state’ involvement in the 
“current social affairs”. 
The third step of our empirical approach consists in the estimation for the countries in 
S.II of the next equation: 
 
) 3 ( 4 3 2 1 it i i i i t it UAI M I PD gdp e a a a a b + + + + + =  
 
where 
i PD   represents  the  HOFSTEDE  score  of  country  ifor  Power  Distance,  and 
i i i UAI M I , , are, respectively, the scores for Individualism, Masculinity ,and Uncertainty 
Avoidance. 
The results are reported in Table 13. All the coefficients are statistically significant and 
their signs are in accord to  0 C hypothesis. The absolute level of the coefficients suggests that all 
the cultural factors have almost the same importance in explaining the evolution of the budget 
deficit, with the interesting exception of PD which has a smaller impact. 
Due  to  the  dimensions  of  S.II,  these  results  are  only  a  “flash”  for  a  more  extensive 
analyze.  However,  it  should  be  mention  the  fact  that  when  EFW is  also  used  like  an 
explanatory variable in Equation (3), appears a diminished statistical significance for all the 
coefficients, situation which is probably a reflection of multi - co - linearity. This could suggest 
that the cultural factors act not only direct on budget deficit, influencing the behaviours of 
public authorities and economic subjects, but also indirect, via the quality of institutions. 
Looking at the global picture, which occurs from the proposed analysis, we can say that 
the theoretical framework employed and the empirical results obtained leads to the conclusions   23 
that structural and institutional aspect of the economic systems, as well as the components of 
the socio-cultural paradigms and the political and civil liberties matters for size and evolution 
of budget deficit.  
But there are a lot of caveats and one can argue that this output is vague and almost a 
truism.  
A) Theoretical limitations  
1) Unclear definition of “structural” characteristics of economic systems 
The  elements  listed  in  Table  1  are  a  “mix”  of  some  components  of  the  economic 
architecture and “quasi”-institutional aspects amalgamated in an unclear picture. Dropping -
down one or other of this does not improve this picture because there is not a coherent effort to 
clarify what is “structural” and what is “functional” and, more, what are the outputs derived 
from the intrinsic configuration of the economies themselves and what are the outputs coming 
from  “policies”.  In  fact,  Table  1  is  not  a  “definition”,  but  rather  an  intuitive  appeal  to  an 
ambiguous concept. 
2) Too “elastic” borders between the three types of economic systems       
Despite the “description” of the three types of economies, it is difficult to distinguish 
between  them,  especially  because  there  is  not  a  set  of  operational  criteria  able  to  allow  a 
reasonable identification. Again, there is no a set of “definitions” attached to this taxonomy, 
and so there is not a coherent framework to place the entire analyses of the growth shocks
14. 
3) Ambiguous presumptions about the state involvement in structural modification  
The involvement of the state in the structural adjustment of the economical systems is just 
presumed without any explanation about the nature, the amplitude and the consequences of 
such involvement. In others words, there is nothing about “how” and “at what price”. And, 
more important, “why”: it is not argue that such implication of the state in the re-building 
process of  a “A” or “B” type of economy is necessary and also it is not explained the reasons 
of the states to initiate and implement the necessary policies. One should note that our position 
is, more or less, a positive approach:  we are trying to seek for an impact of the state’s involving 
on markets functioning, without enquires whether the state is able to improve these markets, or 
whether the outcomes are socially desirables.  
4) “Blank” connections supposed between institutions and growth  
The proposed analyses of the institutional impact do not much clarify about how this 
impact is exercised. To illustrate this, it is enough to look at the description of the property 
rights institutions. The paper indicates that when economic subjects believe their property rights 
are protected, they adopt a set of decisions (in terms of investments, consumptions, savings 
etc.),  which  finally  bust  up  the  economy.  But  nothing  is  implied  about  the  content  of  this 
property rights, about their configuration, and more important, about how there are in practice 
exercised
15.  Also,  the  paper  insists  on  the  importance  of  control  but  it  not  operates  any 
distinctions between different control mechanisms and it not provides any explanations for how 
these mechanisms could operate. 
5) “Institutions” and “policies”: not any words about last ones? 
The  “policies”  are  the  expression  of  the  “institutional”  actions.  This  means  that  the 
“policies” represents the “dynamic” aspect of the “institutional” behaviours and also that the 
actual configuration of the “institutions” is an output of the past “policies”. If this thesis stands 
up, the current observed impact of “institutions” on economic growth incorporate in fact the 
results of current and past “policies” and could be not distinguish from them. So, is not clearly 
how much the emphasized importance of “institutions” for the economic dynamic could be 
assigned to the quality of these and how much this is in fact an outcome of “policies” quality. 
                                                 
14 There is nothing about the nature or causes of these shocks. 
15 See, for instance, an excellent discussion in RODRIK et al [2002]   24 
6) Asymmetric impact of political and civil institutions: why and how? 
The asymmetric impact of the political and civil institutions in the redistribution processes 
is just simply statue but there is no explanation attached to this presumption and also there is 
not any description of its precise nature: if both act  as distributional coalitions, why there 
should be differences between them, others that are generated by the unequal dimensions and 
powers?  
7) The “long”-run of the paradigm? 
We insist in several places that, on “short”-term, the paradigm is exogenous in respect of 
social and economic variables (which means that the “bottom” arrow in Figure 1 could occur 
only on “long” run). 
But the “culture” is not a genetic product; it is a social one. The human person does not 
inheriting  the  culture  like  genes.  There  is  an  assimilation  of  values  process  in  a  social 
environment and we does not provide any arguments for the fact that this process should ex 
ante treated as a “long”-term one
16. Much more, there is no argumentation for these supposed 
long-run  relationships  between  economic  growth  and  paradigm.  In  fact,  does  economic 
development end up by changing the paradigm? And, if this is happened, how could be the 
influences exercised explained?  
Supplementary, if we are viewing the culture only like a learning process, we should 
respond to a most complex approach like the one formulate by the BLACK, GREGERSEN, 
MENDENHAL and STROH [1999]: they treat the culture as a “tree” with its visible parts 
“above”  the  surface  (tangible  aspects  of  a  culture  or  artefacts)  and  with  its  invisible  parts 
“below” the surface (the values and assumptions). Thus, culture is the set of artefacts, values 
and assumptions shared by people (explicit aspects) as well as the set of assumptions and values 
that  influence  and  guide  people' s  behaviour  and  that  is  passed  on  from  older  to  younger 
generations(implicit aspects). We honestly recognize that we are not prepared here to respond 
to such a position. We only mention that the definition of culture which is utilized is simply a 
“working” one, utile for the purposes of the present analysis.  
8) The insufficient number of cultural dimensions and their relevance 
The concept of “paradigm” is a complex one and obviously it could not contain only some 
aspects like “individualism”,” power distance”,” masculinity” or “uncertainty avoidance”. Even 
if we  are picking up only these, we do not supply  any reasons to  consider them the most 
relevant for the topic of economic growth or, at least, we do not presents any discrimination 
mechanism in respect of other values.  
9) Culture and institutions: what kind of distinction?  
We mention that we are taking into account in this paper the formal and the informal 
institutions. But, first of all, we list only the formal ones with out any references to the second 
category (which could not be treaty as simple as “unwritten set of social rules”). Second, it 
could be noticed that the institutional values cover a large part of the paradigm (or, in other 
words, a large part of the paradigm is constituted via the institutional interactions between the 
individual members of a society). Institutions act as “pool” of cultural models concentration. 
Par consequence, there is not a clearly distinction between “paradigm” and institutions and also 
there is not a clearly description of the reciprocals relationships
17.     
10) Structures, institutions and economic freedom: are these the same thing? 
                                                 
16 There are some mentions about the changing of the paradigm in a “generation life” but is obviously that this is 
still a “long”-term. 
17 For instance, there is no argumentation for the thesis that an exogenous established institutional system could 
end up by influencing the paradigm.   25 
The use of EFW is designed to capture, “at least partially”, the structural and institutional 
aspects of economic development. We do not discuss a definition of “economic freedom”
18 and 
also the quality of EFW like a proxy for it. But we should point out the conceptual ambiguity 
which distort this part of analyze: by simply observing the fact that in an measure of economic 
freedom are elements from the areas of “structure” and “institutions” we do not legitimate the 
employment of this measure like a way to describe these. The appeal to EFW should be seen as 
a simple “shortcut”, without a strong theoretical foundation.    
11) The core hypothesis: how critical is their restrictive nature? 
The 
3 1 H H -  hypotheses are the “foundation” of the entire proposed analysis; it could 
easily be observe the fact that they have a restrictive, almost “heroic”, nature. One could rise 
the question if the limitations induce by this nature does not completely distortion our results. 
We do not want to defend these postulates because we are conscious about their weakness. We 
just want to specify the fact that these are necessary to be taking into account in order to place 
the analysis in the context of the mandate approach, in an as simple is possible manner: the 
state is acting on the base of a social mandate and respond, in a way or other, for its actions to 
the  society.  And  this  general  framework  is,  in  our  opinion,  consistent:  only  the  “details” 
proposed by the 
3 1 H H -  hypotheses could be, from our point of view, the object of critical 
enquires. 
B) Empirical analysis weakness  
There are a lot of limitations for the proposed empirical analysis. Some of them are linked 
with: 
· The  stability  of  the  models  and  the  quality  of  the  results  (for  instance, in  terms  of 
properties of the residuals variables); 
· The possible existence of non-linear interactions between the variables and the effects of 
such interactions; 
· The  insufficient  number  of  observation  and  the  absence  of  an  explanation  for  the 
composition of the samples etc. 
C) The difficulties to operate with these results 
Our  results  dos  not  provide  an  efficient  guidance  in  the  implementation  of  the  specifically 
policies for the sustaining of fiscal stability. The major reason for this consists in the absence of 
any  suggestion  about  how  the  structural  changes  could  be  initiated,  institutional  designs 
projected and “right” values and mental models promoted. So, based on these results it is not 
possible to draw a map of desirable policies and to control the effects of the current public 
choices.  
Despite all these caveats, we argue that the paper could be seen as a small breakdown into an 
usual  yet  manner  to  deal  with  the  fiscal  stability  problems  like  they  are  isolated  for  their 
structural, institutional and cultural aspects. 
 
The relation between the State and the Mother Society is almost always a “love and hate” story. 
But it should be remembered that the State is a reflection of the “qualities” and “deficiencies” 
of the Society. Not always an accurate one, this reflection accompanies all the public actions 





                                                 
18 But we tend to see it like the capacity of the individuals to take decisions relevant into an economic perspective 
without any inferences from the public authorities.   26 
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The S.I Sample 
 
Algeria  Mauritius 
Argentina  Moldova 
Bahrain  Mongolia 
Belarus  Nepal 
Bolivia  New Zealand 
Bulgaria  Nicaragua 
Canada  Oman 
Chile  Pakistan 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Paraguay 
Congo, Rep.  Perú 
Costa Rica  Philippines 
Cote d' Ivoire  Poland 
Croatia  Romania 
Czech Republic  Russian Federation 
El Salvador  Senegal 
Estonia   Singapore 
Georgia  Slovak Republic 
Hungary  Slovenia 
India  South Africa 
Indonesia  Sri Lanka 
Israel  Tajikistan 
Jamaica  Thailand 
Jordan  Turkey 
Kazakhstan  Uganda 
Kyrgyz Republic  Ukraine 
Latvia  United States 
Lithuania  Uruguay 
Maldives  Venezuela 
 
The S.II Sample 
 
Argentina  Perú 
Bahrain  Philippines 
Canada  Senegal 
Chile  Singapore 
Costa Rica  Slovenia 
Cote d' Ivoire  South Africa 
Croatia  Thailand 
El Salvador  Turkey 
India  Uganda 
Indonesia  United States 
Israel  Uruguay 
Jamaica  Venezuela 
Jordan  New Zealand 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for budget deficit 
Year  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
1998  2.80  1.91  3.75  -3.44  19.65 
1999  2.80  2.19  3.24  -7.25  13.02 
2000  1.68  1.64  3.55  -10.16  11.45 
2001  1.87  1.39  3.78  -5.75  19.60 
                  
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for EFW  
Year  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
1998  3.10  3.00  0.69  1.54  4.71 
1999  3.08  2.99  0.69  1.54  4.59 
2000  3.07  3.01  0.69  1.59  4.60 
2001  3.03  3.01  0.71  1.66  4.61 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for PR  
Year  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
1998  3.09  2.50  1.99  1.00  7.00 
1999  3.11  2.50  2.02  1.00  7.00 
2000  3.04  2.00  2.04  1.00  7.00 
2001  2.96  2.00  1.96  1.00  6.00 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for CL  
Year  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
1998  3.41  3.00  1.42  1.00  6.00 
1999  3.43  3.00  1.45  1.00  6.00 
2000  3.38  3.00  1.46  1.00  6.00 
2001  3.38  3.00  1.42  1.00  6.00 
 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of the Cultural Factors 
Factors  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
Power 
Distance 
62.14  64.00  19.12  13.00  94.00 
Individualism  37.15  32.00  21.94  12.00  91.00 
Masculinity  47.96  48.00  13.96  21.00  73.00 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
62.48  64.00  22.78  8.00  100.00 
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Table 9: The impact of economic freedom on budget deficit 
Dependent variable:  it bd  
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)   
Sample: 1998 2001     
Included observations: 4     
Cross-sections included: 56     
Total pool (balanced) observations: 224   
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (degree of freedom corrected) 
         
         
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
         
         
C  0.296105  0.644037  0.459764  0.6461 
it EFW   0.569155  0.206431  2.757120  0.0063 
Fixed Effects (Period)         
1998--C  0.742608       
1999--C  0.753321       
2000--C  -0.360202       
2001--C  -0.146389       
         
         
  Effects Specification     
         
         
Period fixed (dummy variables)   
         
         
  Weighted Statistics     
         
         
R-squared  0.175356  Mean dependent variable  3.726304 
Adjusted R-squared  0.160294  S.D. dependent variable  3.872390 
S.E. of regression  3.548482  Sum squared residuals  2757.588 
F-statistic  11.64230  Durbin-Watson stat  0.989880 
Prob.(F-statistic)  0.000000       
         
         
  Un-weighted Statistics     
         
         
R-squared  0.040161  Mean dependent variable  2.290491 
Sum squared residuals  2770.114  Durbin-Watson stat  0.562456 
         
         
 
 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of Residuals 
Year  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
1998  0.00  -0.88  3.65  -5.76  15.93 
1999  0.00  -0.73  3.19  -9.18  10.38 
2000  0.00  -0.15  3.52  -11.78  9.96 
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Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags   
Automatic selection of lags based on MAIC: 0 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Quadratic Spectral kernel 
Balanced observations for each test    
         
                Cross-   
Method  Statistic  Prob.**  sections  Observation 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  -25.5658   0.0000   55   165 
Breitung t-stat   0.66697   0.7476   55   110 
         
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -5.E+155   0.0000   55   165 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square   179.791   0.0000   55   165 
PP - Fisher Chi-square   213.736   0.0000   55   165 
         
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Hadri Z-stat   10.6060   0.0000   55   220 
         
          ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. 
        All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
Table 11: The impact of political freedom on budget deficit 
Dependent variable:  it bd  
     
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)   
Sample: 1998 2001     
Included observations: 4     
Cross-sections included: 56     
Total pool (balanced) observations: 224   
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (degree of freedom corrected) 
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
         
          C  0.081434  0.359533  0.226500  0.8210 
PR   -0.745873  0.143151  -5.210405  0.0000 
CL   1.245818  0.213828  5.826270  0.0000 
Fixed Effects (Period)         
1998--C  0.778474       
1999--C  0.767046       
2000--C  -0.340026       
2001--C  -0.202053       
         
            Effects Specification     
         
          Period fixed (dummy variables)   
         
            Weighted Statistics     
           32 
         
R-squared  0.268247  Mean dependent variable  3.776289 
Adjusted R-squared  0.251463  S.D. dependent variable  4.061437 
S.E. of regression  3.513874  Sum squared residuals  2691.714 
F-statistic  15.98293  Durbin-Watson stat  1.056315 
Prob.(F-statistic)  0.000000       
         
            Un-weighted Statistics     
         
          R-squared  0.064867     Mean dependent variable  2.290491 
Sum squared residuals  2698.813     Durbin-Watson stat  0.610524 
         
           
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics of Residuals 
Year  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
1998  0.00  -1.07  3.57  -6.80  16.54 
1999  0.00  -0.72  3.14  -10.60  8.93 
2000  0.00  0.18  3.57  -12.40  8.46 
2001  0.00  -0.47  3.71  -8.63  16.48 
 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags   
Automatic selection of lags based on MAIC: 0 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Quadratic Spectral kernel 
Balanced observations for each test    
         
                Cross-   
Method  Statistic  Prob.**  sections  Observation 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  -482.131  0.0000  55  165 
Breitung t-stat  0.14050  0.5559  55  110 
         
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -2.E+156  0.0000  55  165 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  190.409  0.0000  55  165 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  214.013  0.0000  55  165 
         
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Hadri Z-stat  10.7891  0.0000  55  220 
         
          ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. 
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Table 13: The impact of cultural factors on budget deficit 
Dependent variable:  it bd  
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)   
Sample: 1998 2001     
Included observations: 4     
Cross-sections included: 27     
Total pool (balanced) observations: 108   
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (degree of freedom corrected) 
         
         
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
         
         
C  -5.701896  1.027125  -5.551319  0.0000 
Power Distance  0.012196  0.006224  1.959431  0.0528 
Individualism  -0.035444  0.007381  -4.801806  0.0000 
Masculinity  0.092432  0.013339  6.929515  0.0000 
Uncertainty Avoidance  0.058056  0.010716  5.417802  0.0000 
Fixed Effects (Period)         
1998--C  0.483584       
1999--C  0.698770       
2000--C  -0.092712       
2001--C  0.540251       
         
         
  Effects Specification     
         
         
Period fixed (dummy variables)   
         
         
  Weighted Statistics     
         
         
R-squared  0.345051  Mean dependent variable  3.380368 
Adjusted R-squared  0.299204  S.D. dependent variable  3.947786 
S.E. of regression  3.304832  Sum squared residuals  1092.192 
F-statistic  7.526219  Durbin-Watson stat  1.156920 
Prob.(F-statistic)  0.000000       
         
         
  Un-weighted Statistics     
         
         
R-squared  0.173974      Mean dependent variable  2.207593 
Sum squared residuals  1177.750      Durbin-Watson stat  0.512474 
         
         
 
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics of Residuals 
 
Year  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
1998  0.00  -0.93  2.81  -3.74  6.23 
1999  0.00  -0.68  3.44  -7.34  9.44 
2000  0.00  -0.03  3.49  -9.46  8.66 
2001  0.00  -0.80  3.66  -5.12  16.17 
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Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags   
Automatic selection of lags based on MAIC: -1 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Quadratic Spectral kernel 
Balanced observations for each test    
         
          Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Hadri Z-stat  5.23347  0.0000  26  78 
         
          ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. 
        All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 